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People have a tendency to view media reports of intergroup confl icts as biased against their own 
group (hostile media perception). However, limited research has been conducted investigating 
how group membership of the perceiver and group membership of the media source combine 
to infl uence perceptions of bias. Muslims and Christians in Indonesia (N = 212) read an article 
describing inter-religious confl ict. The article was attributed either to a Muslim newspaper, 
a Christian newspaper, or an unidentifi ed newspaper. Results indicated the hostile media 
perception only among high identifi ers. There was also some evidence for the predicted role 
of newspaper religion in infl uencing perceptions of bias: the article was seen to be biased in 
favor of Muslims when attributed to a Muslim newspaper, biased in favor of Christians when 
attributed to a Christian newspaper, and intermediate when the newspaper was not identifi ed. 
The effect of newspaper religion was mediated by prior beliefs of bias. Results are discussed in 
terms of heuristic explanations of bias perceptions in the media. 
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There is no doubt that media bias can be real; 
in all sorts of overt and subtle ways, media can 
prejudice one argument over another. However, 
in terms of how people feel about the integrity 
of media coverage, the extent to which the 
coverage is objectively biased is less important 
than people’s perceptions of whether it is biased. 
Furthermore, there is a growing body of evidence 
that perceptions of bias are infl uenced by a range 
of factors that do not relate to the content of 
the media coverage, but rather are embedded in 
the intergroup context within which the issue is 
played out. For example, it has been established 
that the group membership of the perceiver can 
have a dramatic effect on the extent to which 
people perceive media coverage to be balanced 
or biased (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985). One 
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might expect that the group allegiances of the 
media source might also infl uence perceptions 
of bias, however currently there is no evidence 
for this notion. The primary aim of the current 
study is to examine how the group membership of 
the perceiver and the group membership of the 
media source combine to infl uence perceptions 
of bias, and to gain insight into the mechanisms 
by which the group allegiances of perceiver and 
source infl uence bias perceptions.
Bias perceptions and the group 
membership of the perceiver
When partisans view media reports on an inter-
group confl ict, members of both sides tend 
to think the coverage is biased against their 
group, a phenomenon referred to as ‘hostile 
media perception’ (other terms for this phenom-
enon include ‘hostile media bias’ and ‘hostile 
media effect’). The fact that both sides tend to 
view the same media as biased against them 
suggests that the bias is at least partially one 
of perception. Furthermore, the bias appears 
to be fundamentally intergroup in nature. 
Gunther (1992) found that participants’ group 
membership was the strongest predictor of 
whether they perceived media to be hostile to 
their group; in terms of predictive power, it 
easily outweighed dispositional variables such as 
age, sex, education, and generalized scepticism 
toward the media.
A number of theories have been presented 
with regard to the mechanisms underpinning 
hostile media perceptions. One theory is that 
cognitive biases prevent people from ‘reading’ 
the media presented to them accurately. For ex-
ample, when faced with the same information, 
it could be that partisans selectively attend to 
and recall items of news that refl ect poorly on 
their own side and selectively ignore or for-
get items of news that refl ect poorly on the 
opposing side. To date, however, there has been 
no support for the notion that hostile media 
perception is caused by selective encoding 
or retrieval of information (Arpan & Raney, 
2003; Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Schmitt, 
Gunther, & Liebhart, 2004; Vallone et al., 1985). 
Indeed, recent research suggests that partisans 
attend to and remember the same content, but 
categorize a disproportionate amount of this 
information as favourable to the other side, 
thus producing hostile media perception (the 
selective categorization explanation; Schmitt 
et al., 2004). 
An alternative explanation is that people 
hold a host of biased perceptions regarding 
their own group’s values and behaviors. Thus, 
when partisans are presented with an objective 
and balanced view of events, they either feel 
that the opposing arguments are invalid and 
not worthy of inclusion, or they feel aggrieved 
because the media coverage does not converge 
with their own biased perception of their 
group’s superiority (the ‘different standards’ 
explanation). Consistent with this explanation, 
Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken (1994) found that 
strength of attitudes toward the Middle East 
directly predicted perceptions of bias, suggesting 
that perceptions of media bias are partly 
infl uenced by partisans’ jaundiced perspective 
on their group. Schmitt et al. (2004) also found 
evidence for this notion, but the relationship 
between perceptions of accuracy and the par-
tisanship of the participants’ attitudes was 
equally strong regardless of whether the story 
was presented as a news article or as a student 
essay. This was the case even though perceptions 
of hostile bias emerged only when the story 
was presented as a news article; indeed, when 
presented as a student essay, participants showed 
some evidence for a reverse effect (biased 
assimilation). From this pattern of data, the 
authors concluded that the different standards 
explanation was not suffi cient to explain the 
perceptions of bias that emerge uniquely when 
information is presented via the media.
Matheson and Durson (2001) re-examined 
the different standards explanation using a 
social identity framework. In line with the social 
identity perspective (Hogg, 2003; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979; Turner, 1999), they argued that people 
have a fundamental need to believe that their 
group is both positive relative to other groups 
and distinct from other groups. Fair or objective 
coverage is denigrated as biased because it does 
not service group members’ needs to see their 
group as positively distinct from the outgroup. 
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To examine this, Bosnian Serb and Muslim 
partisans responded to newspaper reports of a 
bombing in Sarajevo. Consistent with the social 
identity perspective, hostile media perception 
was greater the more people identifi ed with their 
group, and the link between identifi cation and 
bias was mediated by perceptions of intergroup 
distinctiveness. However, the moderating role 
of identifi cation observed by Matheson and 
Durson (2001) is somewhat inconsistent with 
Duck, Terry, and Hogg (1998), who sampled pol-
itical partisans immediately before and after an 
election. Unlike Matheson and Durson (2001), 
Duck and colleagues (1998) found that group 
identifi cation was not associated with perceptions 
of bias. Furthermore, Arpan and Raney (2003) 
found no relationship between perceptions of 
bias and ‘fanship’, a construct closely related 
to identifi cation among their sample of sports 
followers. It is not immediately clear why the 
moderating role of identifi cation has emerged 
in some studies and not in others. However, it 
is notable that both the studies for which a role 
of identifi cation was found investigated high-
level intergroup confl ict between chronically 
salient groups (i.e. interethnic and inter-religious 
warfare), whereas the studies for which no effects 
of identifi cation were found investigated less 
extreme intergroup confl icts (i.e. rivalry between 
political parties and football teams). One pos-
sible explanation is that the effects of identifi -
cation are latent and do not play a major role 
until activated by very high levels of intergroup 
threat.
 In addition to the cognitive explanation and 
the different standards explanation of hostile 
media perception, Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken 
(1994) suggested that beliefs about media 
bias developed in the past might play a role 
in infl uencing how people view media in the 
present. Before participants viewed the selection 
of media presented to them, Giner-Sorolla and 
Chaiken asked them to rate the extent to which 
they believed the US mass media in general 
favored the Israeli or Palestinian side when re-
porting on the Middle East. They found a weak 
but signifi cant link between prior beliefs and 
perceptions of bias in a standardized selection 
of news reports, independent of other variables 
such as attitudes toward the Middle East, encod-
ing, and recall. The authors reasoned that prior 
beliefs about bias in the media generally might 
operate as a heuristic people use when exposed 
to specifi c media reports. If people believe 
that the media is generally biased against their 
side, then they need not closely scrutinize the 
footage they are exposed to for bias; they simply 
assume it must be there (see also D’Alessio, 
2003, who found that participants who were 
primed to think of media as generally biased 
reported specifi c articles to be more biased). 
Contrary to this explanation, however, Matheson 
and Dursun (2001) found no relationship be-
tween generalized beliefs about media bias 
and the extent to which participants reported 
bias when exposed to newspaper articles. It is 
possible that the discrepancy in results with re-
gard to the infl uence of prior beliefs refl ects the 
different news stories used by these researchers. 
The Middle East confl ict used by Giner-Sorolla 
and Chaiken (1994) arguably lends itself to 
supporting the prior beliefs argument, because 
the US media is frequently accused of showing 
allegiance toward Israel and the Jewish commun-
ity in general. In contrast, Matheson and Durson 
(2001) used Canadian coverage of the bombing 
in Sarajevo as their stimulus material, media 
coverage of which is not stereotypically associated 
with bias. In short, people arguably have salient 
and readily formed opinions about whether the 
US media is capable of reporting the Middle East 
confl ict in a neutral way, whereas there are fewer 
stereotypes and assumptions to bring to bear on 
the question of whether the Canadian media 
is capable of reporting the war in Sarajevo in 
a balanced way. This might help explain why 
prior beliefs were predictive in the former case 
but not the latter.
Taking into account group 
membership of media
The research described above makes the im-
portant point that people’s group memberships 
affect how they perceive media. However, one 
point that has not been addressed in this re-
search is that media outlets are often aligned 
to groups themselves. When people watch a 
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CNN report on the Middle East, many of them 
would be aware that CNN is a fl agship American 
network, and they would also be aware that 
the US has traditionally been an ally of Israel. 
For many Muslims, then, CNN is seen to be a 
vehicle for US propaganda, and it is reasonable 
to assume that people might factor this in when 
deciding whether footage is pro- or anti-Israel. 
Alternatively, many people in the West view the 
Muslim broadcasting service Al Jazeera to be a 
mouthpiece for pro-Arab, anti-American pro-
paganda. Again, it is reasonable to expect that 
the group allegiances of this network will be 
taken into account when people are screening 
for bias. 
This expectation is reinforced by Giner-Sorolla 
and Chaiken’s (1994) observation that beliefs 
about media bias developed in the past might 
act as a heuristic that shapes how people view 
media reports in the present. If people are 
aware that a media outlet has group allegiances, 
this might prime them to assume that their 
reports will be slanted in favor of one group 
over another. Such an explanation would be 
consistent with research and theory showing 
that people are psychologically primed to trust 
ingroup members and to distrust outgroup 
members (e.g. Brewer, 1981; Worchel, 1979). 
For example, it has been found that people 
generally expect that outgroup members will 
discriminate against them if they have the 
chance (Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, & Graetz, 
1990; Vivian & Berkowitz, 1992), and research on 
group-directed criticism shows that people trust 
the motives of outgroup members’ statements 
less than those of ingroup members (Hornsey & 
Imani, 2004). Indeed, some researchers (e.g. 
Brewer, 1981; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000) have 
argued that group membership operates as a 
heuristic that helps us gauge who to trust and 
who not to trust, independent of one’s history 
of interpersonal exchanges. In relation to the 
current research, such a heuristic might lead 
people to believe their own group’s media could 
be trusted, but the outgroup media does not 
have one’s group’s interests at heart. In turn, this 
expectation might taint how they view material 
stemming from that outlet, even if that material 
is objectively balanced and unbiased.
Although this prediction seems intuitive, 
there is very little research that has subjected it 
to empirical scrutiny. An early attempt to take 
media partisanship into account when explain-
ing perceptions of bias was made by Gunther 
(1992), who derived a measure of ‘political dis-
tance’. This was a three-level categorical variable 
that took into account the political allegiance 
of the participant (Republican or Democrat) 
and the political allegiance of the newspapers 
they chose to read (Republican, Democrat, or 
Independent). Participants were categorized 
as being ‘close’ if the political allegiances of 
the reader and the newspaper converged (e.g. 
Democrat reading Democrat newspapers), mod-
erately distant if a politically aligned participant 
read an Independent newspaper, and very distant 
if the political allegiances of the reader and the 
newspaper were in contradiction (e.g. Democrat 
reading Republican newspapers). Gunther 
found that political distance had no effect on 
the extent to which the newspapers were seen 
to be biased against their group. 
An attempt to experimentally examine the 
role of the group allegiances of the media source 
was provided by Arpan and Raney (2003). Arpan 
and Raney examined responses to a fi ctitious 
committee report citing off-fi eld problems at two 
university football teams, one of which repre-
sented the university in which the participants 
were enrolled. The report was reproduced in 
such a way that participants were led to believe it 
was published in either the participants’ home-
town newspaper or in the rival team’s hometown 
newspaper. As expected, participants believed 
the hometown newspaper and its employees were 
generally inclined to favor the hometown team 
more than the rival-town newspaper (Arpan and 
Raney called this measure ‘comparative bias’, 
although the ratings did not relate to the article 
itself). However, when rating perceptions of bias 
in the particular news report they were given, 
no differences emerged regardless of whether 
the article was published in the hometown 
newspaper or the rival town’s newspaper. 
In conjunction with the work by Gunther 
(1992), this study suggests that the group 
allegiances of the media source might not be a 
signifi cant factor in infl uencing perceptions of 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(2)
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bias. However, there are a number of method-
ological problems that may help account for 
this. The main problem in Gunther’s study 
is that fewer than 10% of participants read a 
paper that formally declared its political allegi-
ances, meaning that the overwhelming majority 
of papers were categorized as ‘independent’. 
Second, only a very small percentage of re-
spondents (2%) could be classifi ed as being 
‘very distant’, presumably because people do not 
typically read newspapers that offi cially oppose 
their preferred political party. It is less clear 
why the effects of media group membership 
were not found by Arpan and Raney (2003), 
but one possibility is that the standardized 
article reported an investigation into scandalous 
incidents occurring within the preferred teams 
of both the hometown newspaper and the rival 
town’s newspaper. It is possible, then, that fans 
of the two teams were momentarily united by 
a ‘them-against-us’ mentality, thus activating a 
shared superordinate identity which diluted the 
expected intergroup biases. Consistent with this 
explanation, although the article was perceived 
to be equally biased when attributed to the home 
town and the rival town’s newspaper, the greatest 
amount of perceived bias (against both teams) 
was reported when the article was attributed to 
a neutral town’s newspaper.
The current study
In the study reported below, we examine how 
the group allegiances of a newspaper infl uence 
the extent to which readers perceive the paper 
to be biased. In contrast to Gunther (1992), we 
did so using an experimental design such that 
the same article was attributed to either an in-
group or an outgroup newspaper. Furthermore, 
in contrast to Arpan and Raney (2003), we exam-
ined this question in relation to a vivid, high-
level intergroup confl ict, namely the ongoing 
confl ict between Christians and Muslims in 
Ambon, Indonesia. We hoped that this more vivid 
intergroup context would foster an intensity of 
feeling that would be more conducive to the study 
of intergroup biases in media perception.
Another motivation for conducting the cur-
rent studies is that, although hostile media 
perception is widely regarded to be robust, 
the generalizability of the effect has yet to be 
seriously tested. One striking aspect of the re-
search to date is that it has been conducted 
entirely in Western cultures; specifi cally the US 
(D’Alessio, 2003; Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; 
Gunther, 1992; Gunther, Christen, Liebhart, & 
Chia, 2001; Perloff, 1989; Vallone et al., 1985), 
Canada (Matheson & Durson, 2001), and Australia 
(Duck et al., 1998). According to Hofstede (2001), 
all these cultures are predominately individualist 
in orientation, with the US qualifying as the most 
(and Australia as the second most) individualist 
society of 53 sampled. Individualism is associated 
with individual freedom and a general emphasis 
on self-interest and competition among indi-
viduals. Conversely, in collectivist cultures people 
are taught to rely on the group to survive and 
succeed. Rather than privileging individual 
endeavor, collectivist cultures are more likely to 
require respect to group authority and to allow 
the group to shape people’s thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviors (Hofstede, 1997; Triandis, 1989, 
1995; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai & Lucca, 
1988). Whereas in individualist cultures people 
are taught that independence and a critical 
mind are valuable (even heroic) assets, such 
qualities are more likely to be seen as immature 
and dysfunctional in collectivist cultures, where 
people are taught to respect the hierarchies and 
rules that govern their social worlds (see, for 
example, Kim & Markus, 1999).
Extrapolating from these cross-cultural ob-
servations, one might question whether hostile 
media perception would be as strong in collect-
ivist cultures as in individualist cultures. It could 
be argued that the hostile media effect has an 
individualistic fl avor to it, in that it involves 
taking a sceptical and critical stance toward a 
societal institution (the media). This speculation 
is diffi cult to verify, as very little research has 
been conducted comparing levels of institutional 
trust across cultures. Furthermore, an alternative 
argument can be put forward to argue that 
hostile media perception might be stronger in 
collectivist cultures, where media reports are 
more likely to be interpreted through an inter-
group lens. One practical reason for this is that 
in South East Asia, at least, one is more likely to 
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see media outlets openly acknowledging their 
group allegiances than in North America and 
Australia, where group allegiances of media are 
more likely to be hidden or covert. A more psy-
chological reason is that there is some evidence 
that members of collectivist cultures are more 
predisposed than members of individualist 
cultures to draw sharp distinctions between in-
group and outgroup members (Triandis, 1972). 
So although there is a universal tendency for 
people to cooperate more with members of 
their own group and to trust members of their 
ingroup more than members of the outgroup, 
these tendencies are assumed to be particularly 
pronounced in collectivist cultures. On the basis 
of this, then, one might speculate that members 
of collectivist cultures might be relatively 
unwilling to criticize their newspaper of their 
own group, but relatively willing to criticize the 
integrity of the outgroup’s media.
In sum, a reading of the cross-cultural literature 
does not lead to a clear conclusion as to whether 
perceptions of hostile media would be more 
pronounced, less pronounced, or the same in 
collectivist relative to individualist cultures. 
Nonetheless, if the hostile media effect is to make 
a claim to be refl ecting fundamental, universal 
psychological processes, at the very least it would 
seem important to attempt to replicate the effect 
in a collectivist culture. The urgency to do so 
is reinforced by the fact that many biases that 
have been demonstrated repeatedly in the West 
have failed to be replicated among Japanese 
participants (see Heine, Lehman, Markus, & 
Kitayama, 1999, for a review). The current 
studies respond to this gap in the literature 
by testing hostile media perception within a 
collectivist culture (according to Hofstede, 2001, 
Indonesia is the sixth most collectivist culture 
of 53 cultures sampled).
Another striking facet of previous experiments 
on hostile media perception is that the perceivers 
have been geographically removed from the 
location of the intergroup confl ict. Indeed, in 
many cases, the groups were defi ned attitudinally 
rather than on national or religious grounds. For 
example, Perloff (1989), Vallone et al. (1985), 
and Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken (1994) obtained 
some or all of their partisans by measuring 
attitudes toward the Middle East among students 
in the US, and splitting them according to 
whether they were ‘pro-Arab’, ‘pro-Israeli’, or 
‘neutral’. Thus, many of the participants were 
not of Middle Eastern origin. In addition, 
all of them were located in the US and were 
exposed to American news footage. Matheson 
and Durson (2001) are the only researchers 
to have used ethnic or religious groups rather 
than categorizing people along attitudinal lines. 
However, their sample of Muslims and Serbs 
were expatriates living in Canada; again, they 
were geographically removed from the confl ict 
and were exposed to media reports stemming 
from the West. To respond to these question 
marks regarding generalizability, the current 
study examined hostile media perception in a 
collectivist, non-Western culture (Indonesia) 
among participants who geographically reside 
in the area of confl ict.
Design and predictions
Muslim and Christian participants in Indonesia 
read a newspaper article describing confl ict 
between Muslims and Christians in Ambon. 
Ambon is an island in Indonesia that, from 
2000–2002, was the scene of bloody riots and 
battles between Muslim and Christian villagers. 
Over this period, approximately 2000 people lost 
their lives as a result of these confl icts. 
The group allegiance of the newspaper was 
manipulated by attributing the article either to 
a Christian newspaper, a Muslim newspaper, or 
an unidentifi ed newspaper. In line with previous 
research, we anticipated hostile media percep-
tion, such that both Muslims and Christians 
would view the article to be biased against their 
own religious group. Furthermore, in line with 
the social identity interpretation of the different 
standards explanation (Matheson & Durson, 
2001), we expected that hostile media perceptions 
would be stronger for high identifi ers than for 
low identifiers. Finally, in light of research 
emphasizing the heuristic nature of bias per-
ceptions (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994), it was 
tentatively predicted that participants would 
perceive greater bias against their religious group 
when the report was published in an outgroup 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(2)
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newspaper than when it was published in an 
ingroup newspaper (perceptions of bias in the 
unidentifi ed newspaper were expected to lie 
somewhere in between). This effect was ex-
pected to be mediated by prior beliefs of bias, 
such that people perceive greater bias against 
their group when the article is attributed to an 
outgroup newspaper because they have prior 
beliefs that the outgroup newspaper is biased 
against their group.
Method
Participants and design
Altogether, 262 students from universities in 
Jakarta participated in the study. Twenty-four 
of the participants identified themselves as 
being neither Muslim nor Christian, and so 
were excluded from analysis. The remaining 
sample consisted of more female (N = 174) 
than male (N = 64) participants, with ages 
ranging between 16 and 26 (M = 20.58 years). 
The sample comprised 131 Muslims and 107 
Christians. Participants received a ballpoint pen 
as compensation for their time. Participants 
were randomly allocated to levels of newspaper 
religion, and levels of identifi cation were formed 
on the basis of median splits, resulting in a 2 
(Participant Religion: Muslim or Christian) × 2 
(Identifi cation: high or low) × 3 (Newspaper 
Religion: Muslim or Christian or unknown 
newspaper) between groups-design. After the 
experiment was completed, participants were 
fully debriefed.
Following the presentation of the newspaper 
article we asked: ‘In what newspaper was the 
incident reported?’ Eighteen participants gave 
the wrong answer to this question, and another 
fi ve participants said that they did not know 
the name of the newspaper.1 Finally, three par-
ticipants did not respond to any of the measures 
of perceived bias. These participants were all 
excluded from analysis, leaving a fi nal sample 
of 212 participants.
Procedure and materials
After recording their demographic details, 
participants completed seven items designed to 
assess identifi cation with their religion. The items 
were adapted from a scale by Ellemers, Kortekaas, 
and Ouwerkerk (1999), and included items 
such as ‘This religious group is an important 
refl ection of who I am’, ‘I would tell many 
people that I belong to this religious group’, and 
‘I think my religious group has many things to 
be proud of’ (1 = not at all, 7 = very much; 
α = .95). Participants were then told that they 
would be given a newspaper article about 
the Muslim-Christian confl ict in Indonesia. 
Participants were either told that the article 
was in Republika (a Muslim newspaper), in 
Suara Pembaruan (a Christian newspaper), or 
they were not told the name of the newspaper 
(unknown condition). Where the name of the 
newspaper was identifi ed, we made it clear to 
what religion the newspaper was aligned. After 
naming the Muslim newspaper, for example, 
the following appeared: ‘Republika newspaper 
is owned by Muslims. Republika’s main target of 
readers is Muslim people’. Before reading the 
article, participants were asked to record the 
last time they had read the newspaper (‘today’, 
‘more than 1 week ago’, ‘more than 1 month 
ago’, ‘more than 1 year ago’, or ‘never’). They 
also rated the extent to which they believed that 
the newspaper is generally biased or fair in the 
reporting of news. For example, in the Christian 
newspaper condition they were asked: ‘When 
reporting the news, to what extent do you think 
that Suara Pembaruan favors Christians compared 
to Muslims?’ (1 = biased in favor of Christians, 
5 = fair and impartial, 9 = biased in favor of 
Muslims). This was interpreted as a measure 
of prior beliefs of bias. Because participants in 
the unknown condition did not know to which 
newspaper they were going to be exposed, we 
did not collect measures of prior beliefs among 
these participants. 
Participants then read a newspaper report 
describing a conflict between Muslims and 
Christians. The article—approximately 350 
words in length—was adapted from a real news-
paper article, describing tit-for-tat raids made by 
Muslims and Christians, leading to 51 deaths. 
Adaptations were made to remove references to 
specifi c people and places. No commentary or 
editorializing appeared in the article; rather, the 
article read as a series of factual observations. 
273
Ariyanto et al. media bias
Above the article was either a masthead from 
the Christian newspaper Suara Pembaruan, 
a masthead from the Muslim newspaper 
Republika, or no masthead (unidentified 
newspaper condition).2 
Participants then responded to four items 
designed to measure the extent to which they 
perceived the article to be biased. Participants 
used 9-point scales to rate the extent to which 
their ‘overall impression of the article’ was that 
it was ‘biased in favor of Christians’ (1) or 
‘biased in favor of Muslims’ (9), the extent to 
which the article presented a ‘stronger case 
against Muslims’ (1) or a ‘stronger case against 
Christians’ (9), the extent to which they felt 
the editor’s personal view of the article seemed 
‘anti-Muslim’ (1) or ‘anti-Christian’ (9), and the 
extent to which they felt there was ‘too much 
focus on Muslims’ bad behavior’ (1) or ‘too much 
focus on Christians’ bad behavior’ (9). In all 
cases, the midpoint (5) was anchored with the 
words ‘fair and impartial’. All of the items were 
recoded such that a score of zero represented 
fairness, positive scores indicated that particip-
ants believed the article was biased against 
Christians, and negative scores indicated that 
participants believed the article was biased 
against Muslims. The four items intercorrelated 
strongly and so were combined into a single 
measure of perceived bias (α = .90).
Results
An initial 2 (Participant Religion) × 3 (Newspaper 
Religion) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the 
identifi cation scores revealed no signifi cant 
main or interaction effects (all Fs < 1). Thus, 
perceptions of bias were analyzed using a 2 
(Participant Religion: Muslim or Christian) × 2 
(Identifi cation: high or low) × 3 (Newspaper 
Religion: Muslim or Christian or unknown) 
between groups ANOVA.3 In order to rule out 
the possibility that we were confounding iden-
tifi cation and religion, we performed separate 
median splits for Muslims (low identifiers, 
M = 3.47; high identifi ers, M = 6.29) and for 
Christian participants (low identifi ers, M = 3.76; 
high identifi ers, M = 6.36).4 Preliminary analyses 
showed that the effects remained the same 
regardless of whether or not we covaried out age 
and sex, so the analyses were reported without 
covariates included. 
Analyses on ratings of perceived bias re-
vealed a signifi cant main effect of religion, 
(F(1, 200) = 16.17, p < .001, η2 = .08). Muslim 
participants tended to rate the article as biased 
against Muslims (M = –0.12, SD = 0.86) and 
Christian participants evaluated it as biased 
against Christians (M = 0.40, SD = 1.17). 
Single sample t tests were then conducted to 
examine whether the levels of bias exhibited 
by each group was signifi cantly different from 
zero. The result showed that the level of bias 
was signifi cant for Christians (t(90) = 3.28, 
p < .001), but not signifi cant for Muslims (t(120) = 
–1.51, p = .13).
 The main effect of religion, however, was quali-
fi ed by a signifi cant interaction between religion 
and identifi cation (F(1, 200) = 8.43, p = .004, 
η2 = .04). Analysis of simple main effects revealed 
a signifi cant effect of participant religion for high 
identifi ers in line with the hostile media effect 
(F(1, 200) = 23.48, p < .001). As can be seen in 
Table 1, strongly identifi ed Christians perceived 
the article as favoring Muslims, whereas strongly 
identifi ed Muslims rated the article as favoring 
Christians. Single sample t tests showed that the 
level of bias was signifi cantly different from zero 
for both Muslims (t(60) = 2.75, p = .008), and 
Christians (t(42) = 3.34, p = .002). In contrast, for 
low identifi ers, Muslims and Christians did not 
differ in their perceptions of bias (F(1, 200) = 
0.64, p = .43).
Consistent with predictions, a significant 
main effect of newspaper also emerged on 
perceptions of bias (F(2, 200) = 8.61, p < .001, 
η2 = .08). Collapsing across religious back-
ground, participants who read the article in 
a Muslim newspaper evaluated the article as 
biased against Christians (M = 0.47, SD = 1.02), 
whereas those who read the article in a Christian 
newspaper rated the article as biased against 
Muslims (M = –0.25, SD = 1.04). Collapsing 
across religious background, participants who 
read the article in an unidentifi ed newspaper 
evaluated the article as relatively fair (M = 0.07, 
SD = 0.94). Duncan’s pos thoc tests showed that 
all the conditions differed signifi cantly from 
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each other in terms of the amount of bias. Single 
sample t tests showed that the level of bias was 
signifi cantly different from zero for the Muslim 
newspaper (t(69) = 3.84, p < .001), marginally 
signifi cant for the Christian newspaper (t(63) 
= –1.92, p = .06), and was not signifi cant in the 
unidentifi ed condition (t(77) = .69, p = .49). 
It should be noted that no main effect of iden-
tifi cation emerged (F(1, 200) = 0.18, p = .68), and 
the interaction between identifi cation and news-
paper was likewise nonsignifi cant (F(2, 200) = 
0.66, p = .52). Finally, the interaction between 
newspaper and religion (F(1, 200) = 0.18, p = .68) 
and the three-way interaction (F(2, 200) = 0.25, 
p = .78) were nonsignifi cant.
The role of prior beliefs
As we argued earlier, one possible reason for these 
results is that people have prior beliefs that 
group-aligned media favor their own group, and 
these beliefs tainted the way they interpreted the 
article. Because participants in the unidentifi ed 
condition did not rate their prior beliefs, the 
mediating role of prior beliefs was examined only 
for participants in the Christian newspaper and 
the Muslim newspaper conditions. Consistent with 
predictions, a 2 (Participant Religion: Muslim or 
Christian) × 2 (Identifi cation: high or low) × 2 
(Newspaper Religion: Muslim or Christian) be-
tween groups ANOVA on prior beliefs revealed 
a signifi cant main effect of newspaper religion 
(F(1, 122) = 54.42, p < .001, η2 = .31). Whereas 
people believed that the Christian newspaper 
would be biased in favor of Christians (M = –0.42, 
SD = 1.14), they also believed that the Muslim 
newspaper would be biased in favor of Muslims 
(M = 1.30, SD = 1.41).
There was also a weaker interaction between 
participant religion and newspaper religion 
(F(1, 122) = 5.93, p = .016, η2 = .05). Muslims 
believed the Christian newspaper to be more 
biased against Muslims (M = –0.83, SD = 1.28) 
than did Christians (M = 0.11, SD = 0.63), 
(F(1, 122) = 8.37, p = .005). In contrast, Muslims 
(M = 1.38, SD = 1.31) and Christians (M = 1.19, 
SD = 1.57) believed the Muslim newspaper to be 
equally biased against Christians (F(1, 122) = 0.29, 
p = .60). It should be noted, though, that both 
Muslims (F(1, 122) = 56.26, p = .000) and 
Christians (F(1, 122) = 10.67, p = .001) felt that 
the Muslim newspaper favored Muslims more 
than did the Christian newspaper. No main effects 
of religion (F(1, 122) = 2.85, p = .094), or iden-
tifi cation emerged (F(1, 122) = 0.32, p = .57), 
and these variables did not interact (F(1, 122) = 
1.10, p = .30). Identifi cation did not interact with 
newspaper (F(1, 122) = 0.00, p = .96), and the 
three-way interaction was likewise nonsignifi cant 
(F(1, 122) = 1.75, p = .19).
Because the effects of newspaper religion on 
prior beliefs mirrored the effects of newspaper 
religion on perceived bias, we were encouraged 
to explore further the mediating role of prior be-
liefs. As can be seen in Figure 1, when newspaper 
religion (dummy coded such that 0 = Muslim 
newspaper and 1 = Christian newspaper) and 
the other independent variables were entered 
in a regression model, newspaper religion 
signifi cantly predicted perceptions of bias. But 
when prior beliefs was entered into the model, 
the predictive value of newspaper religion 
dropped to nonsignifi cance. This reduction in 
explained variance was signifi cant according to 
the Sobel test (z = –4.51, p < .001), showing that 
the effect of newspaper religion on perceptions 
of bias was fully mediated by prior beliefs about 
the extent to which the newspaper was biased. 
We also tested the reverse model, in other words 
we tested to see if perceptions of bias mediated 
the relationship between newspaper religion 
and prior beliefs about bias. When perceptions 
of bias were entered in the regression along 
with the independent variables, the relationship 
Table 1. Effects of identifi cation and participant 
religion on perceived bias     
 High identifi ers Low identifi ers 
Muslims –0.30** (0.89) 0.03 (0.79) 
 n = 61 n = 60  
Christians 0.63** (1.22) 0.18 (1.10) 
  n = 43 n = 48  
Notes: Positive scores indicate a perception of bias 
against Christians and negative scores indicate a 
perception of bias against Muslims. Asterisks indicate 
that the score is signifi cantly different from zero using 
single-sample t test: **p < .01. Numbers in parentheses 
are standard deviations.
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between newspaper religion and prior beliefs 
remained highly signifi cant (β = –.42, p < .001), 
reinforcing our confi dence in the integrity of 
the original causal model.
At this point it is not clear where these prior 
beliefs stem from in the fi rst place. One pos-
sibility is that people have beliefs that media 
would favor their constituency, and that these 
beliefs emerge independent of experience with 
that media outlet. An alternative possibility is 
that Suara Pembaruan and Republika are, in fact, 
biased in their news reporting, and that our 
participants are simply recognizing this. If the 
latter explanation is true, it suggests caution 
needs to be applied before generalizing beyond 
the current data. 
Fortunately, we are in a position to make a judg-
ment about this. Before exposing participants 
to the article we asked them the extent to which 
they had experience with Suara Pembaruan or 
Republika (depending on condition). Of those 
who were asked this question, a small subsample 
(n = 29) indicated they had never read these news-
papers. All the same, analysis of variance showed 
that these participants—who had never read 
the newspaper—still expected that Republika 
would favor Muslims (M = 1.15, SD = 1.42) 
signifi cantly more than would Suara Pembaruan 
(M = –0.33, SD = 0.71) (F(1, 27) = 8.67, p = .008, 
η2 = .24). This suggests that expectations of 
bias are infl uenced by heuristics associated with 
knowledge of group allegiance per se rather than 
(or as well as) by experience with the specifi c 
outlets used in this study.
Discussion
Consistent with research on hostile media 
perception, Muslims and Christians differed 
quite markedly in terms of how they perceived 
the same standardized newspaper article. 
Whereas Christians believed the article was 
biased against Christians, there was a (non-
signifi cant) trend for Muslims to see the article 
as being biased against Muslims. The fact that 
we found some support for the hostile media 
effect in (a) a collectivist culture, and (b) using 
participants who were geographically located 
within the country of confl ict, reinforces the 
proposition that hostile media perception has 
cross-cultural generalizability. 
It is interesting to note that Christians in the 
current sample showed a signifi cant tendency to 
perceive the media as biased against Christians, 
whereas the tendency for Muslims to perceive 
the media as biased against Muslims registered 
only as a nonsignifi cant trend. One possible ex-
planation for this relates to the sociohistorical 
context of the areas in which the study was con-
ducted. In Indonesia, Christians are a minority 
in terms of population and political power, and 
have traditionally suffered from persecution 
as a result. It is possible, then, that this group 
would have had a particularly strong motivation 
to defend the integrity of the group and might 
have had particularly negative expectations 
about the capacity of the media to present 
information fairly. Although this conclusion is 
speculative, it might be that minority groups are 
more inclined to see the media as biased than 
are majority groups.
One explanation for hostile media perception 
is that people hold a distorted perception of 
the value and integrity of their group. For this 
reason, neutral or balanced reporting is seen 
to be biased against their group because it does 
not refl ect the partisan’s own distorted world 
view. The moderating role of identifi cation 
observed in the current study lends support to 
this explanation. Whereas high identifi ers from 
both religions showed a sizable hostile media 
Figure 1. The role of prior beliefs in mediating the 
effects of newspaper religion on perceived bias. 
Note: The coeffi cient in parentheses represents the 
direct effect with no mediator in the model. The 
coeffi cient to the right represents the direct effect 
when the mediator (prior beliefs) is included in the 
model.
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effect, low identifi ers did not show the bias at all. 
One explanation for this is that high identifi ers 
are more likely than low identifi ers to hold 
distorted or infl ated views about their group’s 
worth, and so will be more critical of the article 
when it does not refl ect this perception. 
The role of identifi cation in moderating the 
hostile media effect is consistent with Matheson 
and Durson (2001), but inconsistent with two 
other studies which found no evidence that 
identifi cation was implicated in hostile media 
perception (Arpan & Raney, 2003; Duck et al., 
1998). As noted earlier, the studies for which 
a role of identifi cation has been found investi-
gated high-level intergroup confl ict between 
chronically salient groups, whereas the studies 
for which no effects of identifi cation were found 
investigated more benign intergroup contexts. 
Whether the moderating role of identifi cation 
is generalizable beyond examples of extreme 
intergroup confl ict is a question for future 
research. However, it should be noted that 
where hostile media perception effect has not 
emerged—for example Vallone et al.’s (1985) 
analysis of the 1980 US election and Giner-
Sorolla & Chaiken’s (1994) null fi ndings with 
respect to the abortion issue—the authors have 
informally accounted for this by highlighting 
the relatively low levels of partisanship in their 
sample. The current fi ndings—showing hostile 
media perception for high but not for low 
identifi ers—might provide a formal framework 
through which these confl icting results can be 
explained. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that although 
the moderating role of identifi cation seems 
consistent with a different standards explanation 
of hostile media perception, in itself it does not 
provide defi nitive evidence that perceptions of 
different standards are the psychological mechan-
ism through which hostile media perceptions 
emerge. A stringent test of the different stand-
ards explanation would require (a) more con-
crete and specifi c measures of one’s regard for 
the ingroup, and (b) some evidence that these 
perceptions underpin perceptions of media bias 
over and above perceptions of bias per se (see 
Schmitt et al., 2004, for an elaboration of the 
latter point). In short, although the current data 
do suggest that identifi cation (or partisanship) 
is critical in predicting perceptions of hostile 
media, the evidence that this provides for the 
different standards explanation remains some-
what circumstantial.
The role of newspaper religion 
The primary aim of this research was to examine 
how the group allegiance of the media affects 
perceptions of bias. We argued that, when 
screening the media for bias, people take into 
account the group allegiances of the media. For 
example, if Muslims were reading an article on 
inter-religious confl ict in a Christian newspaper, 
it seems reasonable to assume that they would 
anticipate more bias against their group than 
if they read an article in a Muslim newspaper. 
Muslim perceivers might then view the article 
through this lens, such that even neutral material 
is seen to be hostile to their group. Consistent 
with predictions, participants believed that the 
article was biased toward Christians when it was 
attributed to a Christian newspaper, but when 
the same article was attributed to a Muslim news-
paper, the participants believed it to be biased 
toward Muslims. When the newspaper was not 
revealed, ratings of overall bias were inter-
mediate. The fact that perceptions of bias are 
infl uenced not just by the group membership of 
the perceiver but also by the group allegiances 
of the media suggests an important boundary 
condition to the notion that people see media as 
biased against their own group. Although people 
might be generally inclined to perceive that 
media is biased against their group, if the media 
source is presumed to have ingroup allegiances 
this perception can be eliminated. 
Importantly, we were not only able to fi nd an 
effect of group media allegiance, but we were 
also able to articulate why group allegiances 
of the media might infl uence perceptions of 
bias. Specifically, people have prior beliefs 
that outgroup media outlets are biased against 
them, and interpret articles from outgroup news-
papers in line with these beliefs. Furthermore, 
this expectation seems to be applied heuristic-
ally and independent of experience; even those 
people who had never read Suara Pembaruan or 
Republika made assumptions about bias once they 
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knew what their religious constituency was. This 
is consistent with Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken’s 
(1994) proposition that perceptions of bias are 
partly infl uenced by prior beliefs about bias in 
the media. It is also consistent with previous 
theory and research suggesting that people use 
group membership as a heuristic about who 
can be trusted and who cannot (Brewer, 1981; 
Worchel, 1979; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000). In 
the context of the current study, people seem to 
make assumptions that outgroup media cannot 
be trusted to report the news fairly. Ironically, 
their own prejudices about the integrity of the 
news outlet leads them to confi rm their negative 
expectations.
The current data show that, when predicting 
perceptions of media bias, we need to be mind-
ful not just of the group membership of the 
perceiver (as has been the case with traditional 
work on hostile media perception), but also the 
group allegiances of the media. Consumers of 
media do not simply refl ect on the content of 
the message, they peer beyond the words and 
make assumptions based on whether the media 
outlet has previous or apparent allegiances of 
the ingroup or the outgroup (see Hornsey & 
Imani, 2004; Hornsey, Trembath, & Gunthorpe, 
2004, for similar arguments in relation to group-
directed criticism). Where a media outlet has 
real or imagined group allegiances, their ability 
to convince outgroup members that they report 
current affairs in a balanced and fair way may 
be compromised, even when the reporting is 
objectively neutral. Although the current data 
lend some support to the notion that prior beliefs 
about bias play a role in driving perceptions of 
bias, the specifi c cognitive mechanisms by which 
this occurs has not been articulated clearly. 
One possibility is that when people have strong 
expectations of bias they do not elaborate on 
the content, and instead process it heuristically. 
The fact that the content was processed through 
peripheral channels might mean that the 
underlying neutrality of the content was sim-
ply not detected. Another possibility is that the 
expectations of bias led to biases in how the 
content was interpreted, remembered, and/or 
categorized. A priority for future research might 
be to reconcile the heuristic explanation with 
more specifi c cognitive explanations.
Two other limitations of the current study 
should be noted. To ensure that all participants 
were aware of the group allegiances of the 
newspapers, we chose to make the group allegi-
ances of the respective newspapers explicit to 
participants in the instructions (e.g., by saying 
Republika was owned by Muslims and targeted 
by Muslims). One possible consequence of this 
procedure is that we may have inadvertently 
cued expectations of bias among the partici-
pants, thus artifi cially strengthening the effects 
(see D’Alessio, 2003, for a discussion of cuing 
in relation to perceptions of bias). To avoid this 
in future studies, it might be benefi cial to meas-
ure religious identifi cation and prior beliefs 
about media bias in a pretest a few weeks before 
the experiment. Finally, in the interests of gen-
eralizability, it might be useful to see if the 
effects of newspaper allegiance can be found in 
the US and Australia, where mainstream mass 
media subscribe to an ethic of impartiality and 
try to hide or diminish their historical allegi-
ances. In many parts of Europe and Asia, group 
allegiances are declared more openly, potentially 
exaggerating the effects of newspaper group 
membership.
In sum, the current study gives a reasonably 
pessimistic picture about how people read 
media. Even though the article was scripted to 
be as balanced and objective as possible, strongly 
identifi ed (but not weakly identifi ed) Muslims 
and Christians interpreted it to be biased against 
their own group. People were particularly likely 
to label the article as biased against their group 
if it was attributed to an outgroup media outlet, 
and this effect was driven by prior beliefs that 
outgroup media outlets are more biased against 
the group than are ingroup media outlets. These 
results suggest it might be diffi cult to break the 
cycle of suspicion regarding outgroup news 
outlets; people heuristically expect that the 
news will be biased and interpret it in line with 
this expectation, thus reinforcing the original 
expectation, and so the cycle continues. Thus, 
in the short term at least, it appears unlikely 
that news outlets can defl ate accusations of bias 
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simply by reporting the news in an objective way, 
because by virtue of their group membership 
they are condemned to be judged as biased. In 
turn, this perception might fuel already tense 
relations between confl icting groups. Now that 
the basic phenomenon has been established, 
the imperative is to fi nd ways of minimizing its 
destructive effects in areas of extreme intergroup 
confl ict. Attempts to do so will be diffi cult: Trust 
is easily lost but, as the current data suggest, 
diffi cult to regain.
Notes
1. When it became clear that a signifi cant 
number of participants were getting this rather 
straightforward manipulation check wrong, we 
began asking people how they felt about this 
question. A number of people reported that, 
because the answer seemed so obvious, they 
thought the experimenters had provided a false 
masthead and were now asking participants to 
guess what newspaper the article was really from. 
This partly refl ects the fact that our Indonesian 
sample is less experienced in doing quantitative 
surveys than the average Western sample.
2. For those participants who were allocated to 
the unidentifi ed condition, we asked them the 
extent to which they thought the article was 
published in a Christian or a Muslim newspaper 
(1 = defi nitely Muslim newspaper, 5 = unsure, 
9 = defi nitely Christian newspaper). Christians 
were marginally more willing to believe that the 
article was published in a Christian newspaper 
(M = 5.30) than were Muslims (M = 5.02), 
t(75) = 1.99, p = .050). It should be noted that 
89% of the Muslims and 79% of the Christians 
circled a ‘5’ on this scale, and that the scores 
ranged from a minimum of 4 to a maximum 
of 8. This indicates that the bulk of the sample 
were not making guesses as to the nature of the 
newspaper.
3. Given the complexities associated with 
reporting three-way designs through 
regression—particularly when one of the 
independent variables is a three-level categorical 
variable—we have chosen to report the results 
through ANOVA using a median split on 
identifi cation. It should be noted, however, 
that the interpretation of the effects reported 
below remain the same regardless of whether 
the analyses are conducted through ANOVA or 
through regression.
4. Contingency chi-square analysis showed that 
there were equal numbers of high and low 
identifi ers across levels of religion (χ2(1) = 0.10, 
p = .75), and across levels of newspaper 
(χ2(2) = 1.29, p = .52).
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